Modern cryptography is based on various building blocks such as one way functions with or without trapdoors, pseudo-random functions, one way permutations with or without trapdoors, etc. In a quantum world some of the main candidates for these building blocks are broken. For instance, the security of the most popular public-key cryptosystem-RSA-is related to the difficulty of factoring large numbers, and is broken (in principle) by a quantum computer. We investigate some of the remaining candidates, and discuss the resulting "Post-Quantum Cryptography'' (namely, the resulting "modern cryptography in a quantum environment'').
Introduction
The idea of a public key encryption (PKE) was proposed by Diffie and Hellman in their pioneering paper [5] in 1976. Their revolutionary idea was to enable secure message exchange between a sender and a receiver without having the need to meet in advance to agree on a common secret key. Shortly thereafter, Rivest, Shamir and Adleman (RSA) proposed the first candidate for PKE, the RSA PKE. In general, PKE is one of the most powerful cryptographic primitives. Actually, many other basic primitives such as private key encryption, digital signature, bit commitment, oblivious transfer, key distribution, etc. may be derived from the PKE.
Unfortunately, the question of the existence of PKE still remains open. Till now RSA is the most used PKE, but its security is not proven (even under plausible assumptions). The security of this cryptosystem depends on the difficulty of factoring of large numbers into their prime factors. In 1994 Shor [29] showed that on a quantum computer the problem of factorization becomes solvable in polynomial time. If one day a large quantum computer is built, RSA will become insecure. Furthermore, it may well be possible that factoring is also easy for a regular computer even if P = NP or P = (NP ∩ coNP) is assumed. We assume here a quantum world where PKE based on factoring and discrete logarithm is broken. Namely, we consider a problem to be "easy'' if it is solved by a quantum computer, "hard'' if it is hard for a quantum computer, and "potentially hard'' if it is not yet known to be easy for a quantum computer. We call this world "quantum environment''. We ask "what kind of modern cryptography remains once quantum computing becomes a practical tool?'' More specifically, in this paper we ask whether there is a useful PKE in Post-Quantum Cryptography.
The search for PKE based on a different set of assumptions led to several other suggestions [1, 4, 9, 15, 16, 24] . Some PKE systems were already broken on regular (classical) computers (for instance, Chor-Rivest's knapsack PKE [4] ) was broken by Vaudenay [30] ), and others were recently broken on quantum computers (for instance, the cryptosystem based on Pell's equation problem was broken by Hallgren [11] ). The best remaining candidates for PKE that rely on plausible complexity assumptions are those based on lattice problems.
The unique shortest vector problem (u-SVP) is to find the shortest nonzero vector in an n-dimensional lattice where the shortest vector v is unique in the sense that any other vector whose length is at most C v is parallel to v. For C < √ 2 the hardness of approximating SVP was proven in [17] . Recently, this result was improved by Khot [12] . He showed that approximating SVP is hard for C < 2 √ log n . For C = n c it may well be that the u-SVP and approximating SVP are hard (potentially with any constant c).
In 1996 Ajtai and Dwork presented a PKE, based on the worst-case hardness of u-SVP [1] . The security of any random instance of their scheme is based on the assumption that the u-SVP problem with c = 8 is hard on the worst case. Although this cryptosystem has provable security, under a reasonable complexity assumption, it is rather impractical. In order to guarantee security, the public key requires many megabytes [19] . Another problem with that scheme is the non-negligible probability for decryption errors. The u-SVP based PKE of Ajtai-Dwork was later on improved by Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi (GGH) [9] . In contrast to the encryption scheme of Ajtai and Dwork, the scheme of GGH produces decryption error with only a negligible probability, and requires only that u-SVP with c = 7 is hard.
In 2002 Regev [24] presented a new public key cryptosystem, which is also based on u-SVP. This cryptosystem consists only of numbers modulo some large number N, and may be implemented efficiently. It is based on the more plausible assumption that u-SVP with c = 1.5 is hard.
In Sections 3 and 4, we describe AD, GGH and Regev's cryptosystems in detail and we provide chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA) against all these cryptosystems. We show that all these cryptosystems are dramatically weak when an attacker has an access to a decryption procedure. For all three cryptosystems the CCA successfully recover the private key in polynomial time. Thus, although proven secure against limited attacks (if u-SVP is hard), these lattice-based schemes are totally insecure against CCA, and therefore are problematic for conventional PKE.
In Section 6, we discuss some known ways of making such schemes secure against CCA, but we conclude that these known ways are not very promising if the environment is quantum. In more detail, we discuss conventional ways of securing these schemes against CCA, such as non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs, trap-door one way permutations (TD-OWP) and the random oracle model, and we conclude that much stronger complexity assumptions are added in any such construction; namely, with our current knowledge, the hardness of u-SVP is probably not sufficient for designing a CCA-secure cryptosystem. As the scientific community is not yet aware of candidates for NIZK or TD-OWP, etc. in a quantum environment, it may well be that, in a quantum world, CCA-secure PKE will always be impossible. It is important to note that these schemes could still be good for more limited forms of PKE, such as interactive (CCA-secure) PKE, a computationally secure key agreement, and some other important tasks. 1 Recently we learnt about the existence of another CCA against the GGH modification of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem-the reaction attack of Hall, Goldberg and Schneier (HGS). We compare their attack and ours, and explain the differences. We then construct a modified Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem which seems to be protected against the HGS attack, and we show that our CCA still breaks it.
Notation
• Overlined symbols like u, i , s(k) are used to denote vectors or points (for our purposes vector and point are equivalent) in n-dimensional space R n . A vector symbol without overlining denotes vector's norm, i.e., = . We say that a vector x lies on another vector y when vectors x and y are parallel.
• FRC[x] = x (mod 1) denotes the distance between x and the closest integer, so that for any x, |FRC[x]| 0.5.
For We denote the encryption procedure by E(·) and the decryption one by D(·). Sometimes the decryption procedure is called "decryption oracle''.
CCA is a kind of attack in which an adversary tries to achieve some secret information by challenging the decryption oracle. There are two types of chosen ciphertext attack: CCA1 [18] and CCA2 [22] . In CCA1 the adversary is not allowed to send queries to the decryption oracle after she has been given the challenge ciphertext. Therefore, the adversary must find some information that allows her to decrypt the arbitrary ciphertext. For example, finding the secret key is the ultimate CCA1 allowing to decrypt any ciphertext. In CCA2 the adversary is allowed to send queries to a decryption oracle before as well as after she is given the challenge ciphertext (except that she is not allowed to ask for the decryption of the challenge ciphertext after she is given it).
Attacks on the Ajtai-Dwork and GGH public key encryptions

Ajtai-Dwork construction
In this section we recall the construction of Ajtai and Dwork [1] . To simplify the exposition we present the scheme in terms of real numbers with infinite precision as done in [9] . In reality, following [1] one uses approximation, such as n-bits binary expansions.
• Common parameters. Given security parameter n, we let m = n 3 , R = 2 O(n log n) , and r = n −3 . We denote by B (for big) the n-dimensional sphere of radius R, and by S (for small) the n-dimensional sphere of radius r. • Private key. Given security parameter n, the private key is a uniformly chosen vector in the n-dimensional unit sphere. We denote this vector by u. • Public key.
(1) Select a 1 , . . . , a m uniformly from the set of vectors {x ∈ B| x, u ∈ Z}, where x, y denotes the inner -product of the vectors x and y, and Z denotes the set of integers.
(2) For i = 1, . . . , m select i,1 , . . . , i,n uniformly in S, and set i = n j =1 i,j . (Thus, each of the i 's is a random variable which is almost "concentrated uniformly'' among the vectors of length √ n · r.) (3) Set v i = a i + i , for i = 1, . . . , m. (4) Let i 0 be the smallest i for which the width of the parallelepiped spanned by v i+1 , . . . , v i+n is at least n −2 · R.
For j = 1, . . . , n, let w j = v i 0 +j , and denote by P (w 1 , . . . , w n ) the parallelepiped spanned by w 1 , . . . , w n . The public key consists of the sequence of vectors (v 1 , . . . , v m ) and the integer i 0 ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
• Encryption. To encrypt a 0, we uniformly select b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ {0, 1} m , and reduce the vector v = m i=1 b i · v i modulo the parallelepiped P (w 1 , . . . , w n ). By reducing a vector v modulo P, we mean obtaining a vector v in P so that v = v + n i=1 c i · w i , where the c i are all integers. The vector v is the ciphertext which correspond to the bit 0. To encrypt 1 we uniformly select a vector v in the parallelepiped P. This vector is the ciphertext which correspond to the bit 1.
• Decryption. Given a ciphertext, c, and the private key u, we compute = c, u . We decrypt the ciphertext as 0 if is within 1/n of some integer and decrypt it as 1 otherwise. 
Geometric intuition
Before we give a formal mathematical description of a CCA, we provide some geometric intuition. From a geometric perspective the space of the ciphertexts is the n-dimensional space of real numbers (see Fig. 1 ). This space is "split'' by parallel (n − 1)-dimensional hyper planes. The distance between neighboring planes is 1. The unit vector u (private key) is orthogonal to the planes. The point that is placed close (nearer than 1/n) to a plane encodes 0. The point that is far from any plane encodes 1.
Encoding of 0 is a process of finding a point placed close to one of the planes. This point must be indistinguishable from one chosen at random. The points (a 1 , . . . , a m ) belong to the planes. The sum of any combination of a i 's is a point that belongs to one of the planes. The public key is (v 1 , . . . , v m ), where v i = a i + i . Vectors i are random and short: a i ? i , thus any combination of v i 's gives a point close to one of the planes, but indistinguishable from a random one.
In our chosen CCA we choose some lines, each defined by a unit vector . If such a line is not parallel to the planes, it intersects them. By asking the decryption oracle for a decryption of a polynomial number of points along one can find the angle between u and . By repeating it for several such vectors one can learn the private key u. The attack is described in the following section.
Chosen ciphertext attack: key recovery (CCA1)
The result of this attack is a unit vector u, which is the private key, i.e., our attack recovers the private key. At first we describe a procedure, PROJECT, that computes the projection of u onto some unit vector . Input: Unit vector , decryption oracle D(·). Output: The absolute value of projection u onto , i.e., | , u |.
• First, the procedure finds a vector c laying on the ray such that D(c) = 0. The probability that for some random vector c, D(c) = 0 is 2/n. The number 2/n is polynomial in n, thus we may effectively produce c at random. • Second, the procedure PROJECT computes two ciphertexts s 1 and s 2 lying on the ray . Both these ciphertexts are encryptions of 1. Additionally, they have a property that decryption oracle changes its value on the intervals (s 1 , c) and (c, s 2 ) exactly once (see Fig. 2 ). The ciphertexts s 1 and s 2 may be found by the next formulae: where k 1 , k 2 are indices for integers. The search procedure looks over all k 1 , k 2 = 0, 1, 2, . . . in order to find the minimal values satisfying (1) . For two vectors D(s 1 ) = D(s 2 ) = 1, and the following two lemmas assure us that we can perfectly learn the distribution of ciphertext in the interval [s 1 , s 2 ]. Intuition: Let us consider s 1 (similarly we could consider s 2 ), and remember that the interval where D(x) = 0 is at least 2/n, with the vector c in it. We are searching for a point s 1 where D = 1, such that there is only one change of value between s 1 and c. The first try is at c − 1/n on the ray . For any n 4 we are promised that the intervals of x such that D(x) = 1 is at least as large as the interval of x such that D(x) = 0. Suppose, decryption oracle returns zero at point defined by k − 1. Then, if D = 0 at point defined by k, doubling the distance cannot take us too far while skipping a whole area of D = 1.
Proof. For a formal proof see Appendix A. Intuition: Assume that the vector is not parallel to the hyper plains, so that the interval of D = 0 or D = 1 is at most exponentially large (and not superexponentially large). Then the search as described after Eq. (1) is done in polynomial number of steps.
Proof. For a formal proof see Appendix A.
• Using a binary search find the two points near c where D(·) changes its value. We denote these vectors by 1 and 2 .
In order for the outcome to be correct to a precision , an order of k + log (1/ ) steps are required. With ≈ 2 n O(1) the search is polynomial in n, and the precision in the obtained 's is exponentially good. • From the distance between 1 and 2 we find the projection of u onto (see Fig. 3 ): In order to find u we get an orthonormal basis { 1 , . . . , n }. Using the procedure PROJECT described above, we compute | i , u | for each i = 1, . . . , n. Note that we cannot learn the sign of i , u by the procedure above. The vector u in the basis
where p i ∈ {−1, 1} is the sign of the projections. The next step is to learn the p i 's. The overall sign of the u is unimportant, because |FRC( c, u )| = |FRC( c, −u )|, thus it may be assumed that p 1 = 1.
The following lemma gives a tool for finding p i 's, i 2. 
where
is the projection of u on the two-dimensional subspace spanned by 1 and i .
Intuition:
To learn p i we look at the subspace spanned by 1 and i . We guess p i . If the guess is correct then for any ciphertext c in {x 1 + y i : x, y ∈ R} the decryption given by D(·) must be equivalent to the one given by u 1,i .
Proof. It is enough to show that c, u = c, u 1,i .
Given an index i, we choose an arbitrary p i , compute u 1,i , and, by challenging the decryption oracle with random vectors from the set {x 1 + y i : x, y ∈ R}, decide whether the guess of p i is correct. For any parameter n , a polynomial number of calls to the oracle is enough in order to achieve an exponentially good probability of obtaining the p i 's correctly.
Chosen ciphertext attack: hidden-message decryption (CCA2)
An attacker has a ciphertext c, and wishes to decrypt it, without disclosing c. Decryption procedure in Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem has a property that with large probability
Indeed, the projection of sum of E(0)'s onto u produce a number close to some integer, when FRC(
is a number, which is far from any integer. The attacker chooses some encryption of 0, adds it to c and asks the decryption oracle to decrypt the sum. The answer returned by the oracle is the decryption of the ciphertext c.
The CCA2 is much weaker than the CCA1, and furthermore it is much simpler. Yet, it is still worth to show a CCA2 against Ajtai-Dwork since it may be possible to protect this cryptosystem against CCA1 while not against CCA2.
An attack on the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi cryptosystem
The encryption method in the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem may cause decryption errors, though with small probability. In [9] a modification of the encryption method was introduced so that the legitimate receiver always recovers the message sent. In this section we show that the modified construction is susceptible to a CCA as well.
In the modified scheme, just like in the original Ajtai-Dwork scheme, encrypting of a 0 results in a ciphertext c such that c, u is close to an integer. However, we also make sure that encrypting of a 1 results in a ciphertext c such that c, u is far from any integer. The modified scheme is as follows:
• Common parameters and private key. The common parameters n, m, R, r, B and S, and the private key u, are set in exactly the same manner as in the original scheme. • Public key (modified).
(1) The vectors v 1 , . . . , v m are chosen exactly the same manner as in the original scheme. Namely, we first select at random the vectors a 1 , . . . , a m ∈ B s.t. a i , u ∈ Z, then choose the "small vectors'' 1 , . . . , m and set v i = a i + i . (2) The integer i 0 is set just like in the original scheme, as the first index for which the width of the parallelepiped P (v i 0 +1 , . . . , v i 0 +n ) is greater than n −2 · R. (3) In addition, we pick i 1 uniformly at random from all the indices i for which a i , u ∈ 2 · Z + 1. That is, i 1 is selected so that a i , u is an odd integer. We note that such an index exists with probability ≈ 1 − 2 −m . The public key consists of the sequence of vectors (v 1 , . . . , v m ) and the integers i 0 , i 1 ∈ {1, . . . , m}.
• Encryption (modified). We encrypt a 0 just like in the original scheme, by uniformly selecting b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ {0, 1} m , and reducing the vector m i=1 b i · v i modulo the parallelepiped P (w 1 , . . . , w n ). The difference is in the encryption of a 1. We do that by uniformly selecting b 1 , . . . , b m ∈ {0, 1} m and reducing the vector 1 2
• Decryption (modified). Given a ciphertext, c, and the private key u, we compute = c, u . We decrypt the ciphertext as a 0 if is within 1 4 of some integer and decrypt it as a 1 otherwise. In contrast to the encryption scheme of Ajtai and Dwork, the scheme of Goldreich, Goldwasser and Halevi does not produce decryption error.
The only difference in the decryption procedure between Ajtai-Dwork and Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi cryptosystem is the threshold value of FRC( c, u ). In the Ajtai-Dwork scheme this value is 1/n, while in the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi scheme it is 1 4 . If an attacker wishes to break the new construction, he may use the CCA described in Section 3.3. The only difference is in the calculation of s 1 and s 2 . For the Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi it is
The formal proof that the private key can be recovered follows the same steps as the proof given for the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem. The only difference in Appendix A. Lemma 3.1, each appearance of n is replaced by 4.
An attack on Regev's public key encryption
Regev's construction
Regev's cryptosystem [24] is similar to Ajtai-Dwork's, but it is defined in a one-dimensional space. Let us consider a normal distribution P k, (r) with median k and variance /2 , where ∈ R + :
This probability distribution has its maximum at r = k and goes to zero at infinity. By summing the distributions P k, (r) over all integers we obtain a periodic normal distribution that achieves maxima on r ∈ Z. By normalizing this periodic distribution in the range [0, 1) we obtain the distribution Q (r):
Based on the distribution Q, Regev [24] defines the "wavy distribution'' T h, (r), in the range [0, 1), where ∈ R + and h ∈ Z + :
For h ∈ Z + (later on in Regev's paper the distribution is extended so that h can actually be real) the distribution T h, represents a wavy distribution with h − 1 picks in the range [0, 1) plus two half peaks at the boundaries. Each peak (up to an exponential tail outside that range) is distributed according to a normal distribution. Regev then shows that, in the range [0, 1), a random variable distributed according to T h, cannot be efficiently distinguished from a variable distributed uniformly. (More precisely, he proves [24, Theorems 3 and 4.5] that if, for a certain range of h(n) and (n, g(n)), where g(n) is any function such that 4 √ n g(n) poly(n), there exists a computationally efficient distinguisher between the uniform distribution U and the wavy distribution T h, , then there exists a solution for g(n)u-SVP.) Furthermore, some analysis of the potential hardness of distinguishing between T h, and U against quantum computers is provided in [24] based on the results of [23] .
Regev's cryptosystem is defined as follows: • For a security integer parameter n, let N be 2 8n 2 and let m be c m n 2 where c m > 8 is any integer constant. • Private key: Choose a real number h ∈ √ N, 2 √ N such that FRC(h) < 1/16m at random. Let d denote N/ h. The private key is the number h. • Public key: Choose ∈ [4 · (n log n) −2 , 8 · (n log n) −2 ) uniformly at random. Choose m values {z 1 , . . . , z m } in [0, 1) distributed according to T h, . For i ∈ 1, . . . , m, let a i denote z i · N . Let i 0 be an index such that a i 0 (mod d) is odd. The public key is (i 0 , a 1 , . . . , a m ). • Encryption: In order to encrypt a bit b we choose a random subset S of {1, . . . , m}. The encryption (ciphertext),
(Regev proves [24, Lemma 5.4] that if there is a polynomial-time algorithm that distinguishes between encryptions of 0 and 1, then there is a distinguisher between the wavy distribution and the uniform distribution.) • Decryption: On receiving an integer w ∈ [0, N) we decrypt 0 if |FRC(w/d)| < 1 4 and 1 otherwise. In [24, Section 5.1] Regev proves that from observation of the ciphertexts an attacker cannot achieve valuable information about the encrypted bits. Also he shows that decryption procedure produces errors only with negligible probability.
Chosen ciphertext attack: key recovery (CCA1)
Intuitively, some ciphertext c encodes 0 when it is close enough to a peak of the distribution T h, . The main idea of the attack is to find the exact positions of the peaks. We use the fact that each wave in the distribution is symmetric about its peak and the points where decryption oracle changes its value ( 1 and 2 ) have the same distance from a peak . If we find 1 and 2 , we will know . Using binary search one may find the points where the function D(·) changes its value from 0 to 1 or vice versa. This algorithm needs a point c on which D returns 0, and two points s 1 and s 2 , defined as Proof. In order to find s 1,2 we sequentially iterate through k = 0, 1, 2, . . . . By definition, the maximal length of an area where points have the same decryption is O(N ), namely the maximal distance between s 1,2 and c is O(N ). From (13) , for the first value of k where D(s) changes its value holds:
The maximal number of iterations is O(log √ N), thus s 1,2 may be found efficiently.
The result of the binary search is two points 1 and 2 . From these two values one may calculate the private key d as
Chosen ciphertext attack: hidden-message decryption (CCA2)
We recall that theAjtai-Dwork cryptosystem is susceptible to a CCAthat decrypts some hidden ciphertext (see Section 3.4 for details). Regev's cryptosystem is susceptible to such attack as well. An attacker chooses some encryption of 0, adds it to a ciphertext and asks the decryption oracle to decrypt the sum. The answer returned by the oracle is the decryption of the ciphertext (see Eqs. (6) and (7)).
Chosen ciphertext attack in the context of provable security
The security of Ajtai-Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems can be proven under the assumption that u-SVP is hard. In this context, it is important to understand that our CCA does not contradict the potential hardness of u-SVP. Also, our attack does not contradict the security of trapdoor one-way functions implemented by these cryptosystems. In other words Ajtai-Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems still represent semantically secure trapdoor one-way functions, namely, secure against plaintext attacks. Later on, we discuss the possible ways that might make these cryptosystem secure against CCA (see Section 6).
Let us recall the main theorem in the proof of security of the Ajtai-Dwork and GGH cryptosystems (Regev PKE security is based on a similar proposition). Goldreich et al. [9, Theorem 2] ). Under assumption u-SVP, it is infeasible to distinguish the encryption of 0 from a uniformly distributed point in P = P (w 1 , . . . , w n ), when given (v 1 , . . . , v m ) and i 0 as auxiliary inputs.
The reason for the weakness of Ajtai-Dwork and GGH schemes against a CCA is hidden in Theorem 5.1: the theorem applies to one who does not know the shortest vector, but does not apply to the owner of the private key. In a CCA the owner of the private key is performing the decryption for the attacker, helping the attacker to distinguish the encoding of zero and the encoding of one. Once the attacker can decrypt (with the help of the key owner) then he may obtain information about the private key.
Design rationale of a public key cryptosystem resistant against CCA must differ from the one given in Ajtai-Dwork. If the private key secrecy depends on the hardness of some problem, the possibility to decrypt must not lead to simplification of this problem. For example, in the RSA cryptosystem, the secrecy of the private key depends on the hardness of factorization of large numbers. But, as far as currently known (for classical computers), the problem of factorization remains hard, even when decryption oracle is given, and CCA does not gain information about the private key.
Decryption and encryption in Ajtai-Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems are "asymmetric'', i.e., these procedures are different, and the private and secret keys are not interchangeable. From this point of view these cryptosystems differ from the RSA. RSA's keys are equivalent:
where N = p · q is a large number, p and q are primes. The values e and d are the public and private keys, respectively, and e · d = 1 (mod (N )) ( (N ) = (p − 1)(q − 1) is the Euler function). RSA's encryption and decryption are identical. Intuitively, the symmetry of RSA is a reason of its security against CCA1: it seems that if a CCA1 on RSA would be possible then due to the symmetry chosen plaintext attack would also exist.
It is well known that RSA is susceptible to a hidden-message decryption via CCA [25] . An attacker who wishes to find the decryption m = c d (mod N) of a ciphertext c can choose a random integer s and ask for the decryption of the innocent-looking message c = s e · c (mod N) . From the answer m = (c ) d , it is easy to recover the original message, because m = m · s −1 (mod N). Therefore, RSA is weak against CCA2.
In the context of CCA, the main difference between the RSA and the Ajtai-Dwork/GGH/Regev cryptosystems is that in RSA the private key remains secret. An attacker may recover some specific message, but not the private key. In the Ajtai-Dwork and Regev's cryptosystems the private key by itself may be recovered by a CCA, so it is weak against CCA1 and CCA2.
It is interesting to compare the lattice based cryptosystems to Rabin cryptosystem [21] . The Rabin encryption scheme is the first example of a provably secure public-key cryptosystem (compare to Ajtai-Dwork, GGH and Regev PKE's that are also provably secure), i.e., the problem faced by a passive adversary of computing square root modulo a composite N is computationally equivalent to factoring N. The private key in Rabin cryptosystem is two primes p and q. The value N = p · q is the public key. Encryption procedure computes E(m) = m 2 (mod N) (this is the same as encrypting in RSA with e = 2). Decryption may be performed by anyone who knows the private key (p, q), i.e., the factoring of the N. Similar to Ajtai-Dwork, GGH and Regev cryptosystems, Rabin PKE is completely insecure against CCA1 (and consequently against CCA2). Using several calls to decryption oracle one can easily find the factoring of N. This result is immediately implied by Rabin's proof of security. Yet Rabin cryptosystem is less interesting than the u-SVP based cryptosystems, as it is broken by quantum computers.
Protection of PKE against CCA in a quantum environment
The main inspiration for our work was to study the potential answers to the following question: "What kind of modern cryptography remains once quantum computing becomes a practical tool?'' We showed here that the strongest candidates for PKE in a quantum environment are broken by CCA. We now have to check the potential ways to re-gain security against these CCAs. Recently there were several attempts to construct techniques that make PKE resistant against CCA. It was shown [6, 14, 18, 26] how the encryption procedure may guarantee correctness of the ciphertext (i.e., that the ciphertext has been generated by a legitimate encryption procedure) by a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof. But, to the best of our knowledge, all known NIZK proofs are based on trapdoor one-way permutation [7] or quadratic residue problem [13] . Till now, the only reasonable candidate for a TD-OWP is RSA that is insecure against quantum computers. The quadratic residue problem is also weak against quantum computer. Furthermore, there is some evidence that NIZK is impossible unless based on one-way permutations [8] .
The possibility to use interactive zero knowledge seems to be less interesting, because interactions turn PKE into interactive-PKE, which is somewhat similar to key agreement.
Another way to protect a PKE against CCAs is based on the random oracle model [2] . Designing a scheme so that it is provably secure in the random oracle model is usually a good engineering principle leading to practical schemes based on pseudo-randomness (see [20] ). However, we do not have a way to judge whether a particular construction is good, and some constructions were broken [3] .
Related works
Recently we learnt about the existence of the HGS reaction CCA [10] against the GGH variant of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem. The HGS attack is somewhat similar to ours, yet, the two attacks are quite different. We construct here a modification of the AD-GGH (and Regev's) cryptosystem, and we explain how it can be easily attacked by our attack. It seems that the HGS attack cannot be modified to efficiently attack such modified cryptosystems.
In AD, GGH and Regev's cryptosystems, there is a region in the ciphertext space where ciphertexts are decrypted as "0'' and an adjacent region where ciphertexts are decrypted as "1'', such regions then appear periodically (namely, "0''; "1''; "0'';…). The main step in HGS and in our attack is to find very precisely the borderline between the "0'' regions and the "1'' regions. This step is significantly different between our attack and HGS attack. We find the borderline between two specific regions, while HGS searches the borderline in different regions, strongly relying on the exact periodicity of the problem.
The HGS project-finding step: Let us observe the AD-GGH version 2 in which the regions' borderline are exactly at integers plus/minus 1 4 . Suppose we are given a simplified oracle D i (x) which computes x · |u i | and returns "0'' if the results are within 1 4 of an integer, otherwise "1'' is returned. Assuming that |u i | = d 0 .d 1 d 2 . . . d r (in binary representation) we can determine |u i | using the following algorithm 3 : 
The input of the decryption oracle is
where c is an integer. Suppose the result returned by the decryption oracle is "0''. It means that one of the following two cases holds:
0.1 2 d j + 0.01 2 d j +1 + 0.001 2 d j +2 + · · · 3 4 .
2 A similar argument applies to Regev's cryptosystem as well. 3 There is a minor bug in [10] . The decryption oracle is called with 2 j +1 instead of 2 j −1 (line 2). In this case bits d 1 and d 2 are ignored and the algorithm works correctly only for d 0.25.
If the sum is less than 1 4 then both d j and d j +1 are zeroes. Otherwise if the sum is greater than 3 4 then both d j and d j +1 are ones. Assuming that the result returned by the oracle is "1'', we obtain that one of the bits d j , d j +1 is zero and the other is one (but one of the bits, d j , is already known from the previous iteration of the algorithm).
Comparing with our method, the HGS attack has an advantage when attacking the GGH cryptosystem. Their "projection finding'' procedure is nonadaptive, 4 i.e., all the ciphertexts can be chosen in advance and they do not depend on one another. The price to be paid though is that the attack strongly relies on the periodicity of the problem, and simple modifications could regain security, e.g, by making the attack exponentially inefficient.
For example, one may define a cryptosystem similar to GGH, but different in the decryption procedure, where some ciphertext is an encryption of 0 if and only if its projection onto the secret key u is within (− 1 4 , 1 5 ) of some integer. For our attack, the modification is totally trivial, because the binary search will still find the boundary as easily as before, while modifying the HGS is much less trivial (although still possible).
A much more interesting example is using a pseudo-random generator to define the position of the borderline between encryptions of "0'' and "1''. Suppose we are given a (publicly known) pseudo-random function "rand(·)'', such that its input is an integer number and the output is within (1/n, 1 2 − 1/n). For each integer-defined region, the borderline with its two neighboring (half-integer) regions is now a random (but known) number between 1/n and 1 2 − 1/n. The width of the layers with encryptions of "0'' and "1'' is fully determined by the pseudo-random function and is therefore different for each layer, so that the periodic nature of the problem is partially damaged. The decryption oracle is formally defined as
with FRC (also defined in our paper), the distance to the closest integer, and ROUND, the closest integer. The above variant of the Ajtai-Dwork cryptosystem 5 makes HGS attack virtually impossible. At the same time our attack still requires just a trivial modification, since the new borderline is publicly known.
Discussion
We presented CCA on three lattice-based cryptosystems: Ajtai-Dwork, GGH and Regev's PKE. The attacks are based on the fact that these cryptosystems are proven secure in the sense that distinguishing the encryption of 0 from the encryption of 1 is as hard as some lattice problem. As a result of this security proof, the private key actually becomes more vulnerable: the attacker can use the key owner's ability to distinguish encryption of 0 from encryption of 1, as a tool to attack the private key. We present here explicit attacks on the three cryptosystems, and provide the full details of the algorithm used for the CCA.
Yet it is important to mention that lattice based cryptosystems (especially the recent one by Regev [24] ) are probably the best Post-Quantum candidates for key agreement protocol, collision free hash functions, oblivious transfer and secure secret key cryptosystems, with security based on well studied complexity results, including even some analysis of potential security against quantum computers as well [23] .
We leave as an open problem whether the lattice based PKE can be modified so that they become secure against CCA. With RSA (and similar ciphers) broken by quantum computers we suspect that there is no good reason to expect the existence of TD-OWP or NIZK. In other words, with the current understanding of theoretical Post-Quantum Cryptography, we have some doubt about the existence of a provable secure PKE, secure against CCA. Yet, a better understanding of random oracle model and zero knowledge proofs or new candidates for TD-OWP might lead to CCA security of PKE.
Proof of Lemma 3.2. Assume that | u, | 2 −n O (1) . The chance that such condition does not hold is negligible: it is [S n−1 /S n ]2 −n O(1) with S n being the surface area of n-dimensional ball. In order to find s 2 we run through all k's until , u c + 2 k n > 1 n .
(A.7)
We denote the minimal k, which satisfies (A.7) by k min . At first we will show that 1 4 FRC(s(x )/d) 3 4 .
(A.11) 100  112 505  197  200  433 576  397  300  971 694  603  400  1 717 341  798  500  2 475 439  996  600  3 846 192  1203 Ajtai-Dwork's cryptosystem the number of calls to the oracle may be approximated by 15.3 · n 1.93 , and for Regev's cryptosystem by 2 log N . In Ajtai-Dwork's and Regev's cryptosystems the size of the public key is O(n 4 ). It means that the complexities of the attacks are less than the effort of the legitimate user.
